I was recently re-watching the documentary “Call of the Mountain” about the founder of deep ecology, Arne Naess. I have written a bit about this documentary and Naess’ thought in a previous column about ecology, care, and love. On this particular viewing, I was taken by a description of the Kantian distinction between a moral act and a beautiful act. The reading of Kant in the documentary is drawn from an article that Naess wrote on the implications of exploring the foundations of ethical action, as it pertains to tactical aspects of deep ecology. As someone deeply concerned about the world we are leaving the young people CYC is serving, I have an interest in both what Naess is saying about tactical interventions into the ecological crisis of this historical moment, as well as the practice implications for ethical action in the work we do in CYC. But, before I turn to the question of ethics and tactics, I want to note one other thing from the documentary that has struck me each time I have watched it and which I think has profound implications for the work we do.
In the film, Naess remarks on how he is often seen as a pessimist because of his deep critique of contemporary society and its devastating impacts on the ecology in which we are embedded. He takes issue with this reading of his work and activism and argues that he is instead an optimist, just not an optimist for the 21st century. Instead, he says he is an optimist for the 22nd century. Our current century he says, will be full of hardship, bad decisions, and ecological devastation. However, he argues that this profoundly painful and destructive century will force us to revise our society in such a way as to survive the effects of our current actions. He is optimistic, that although it may take 100 years, we will adjust and persist. This is why he thinks of himself as an optimist.
I have to say that I share his perspective at a number of different levels. When I hear Naess working within such extended time frames, I am reminded of a story Gregory Bateson used to tell. The story is likely apocryphal but has to do with an ancient set of oak beams in the dining hall at New College Oxford. It seems that about 100 years ago or so, the beams were discovered to have an infestation of beetles that were weakening them structurally. This caused some dismay, as the kind and size of oak trees that were used to make beams of the width and length used in the dining hall had become quite scarce. In desperation, the college council reached out to the College Forester,
He pulled his forelock and said, “Well sirs, we was wonderin’ when you’d be askin’.”
Upon further inquiry it was discovered that when the College was founded, a grove of oaks had been planted to replace the beams in the dining hall when they became beetly, because oak beams always become beetly in the end. This plan had been passed down from one Forester to the next for over five hundred years saying “You don’t cut them oaks. Them’s for the College Hall.”
Bateson would conclude the story by saying that this is the way to organize a society. That is to say, with an eye to the future at all times. In this case, preparing a solution to a problem foreseen 500 years in the future.
I think of this in the light of Naess’ comments about optimism, because it seems to me that we can be quite myopic in our contemporary society. Often times, it would appear that we can only see the world through the lens of our current set of crises. We have a very hard time imagining a future that might operate on radically different terms. I read Bateson and Naess as suggesting that there is every reason to be pessimistic about the current state of affairs, while at the same time thinking through what we may need to do now, so that 100 years from now we have left a legacy that can be drawn on to solve the problems of the 22nd century.
This can only be done through action, of course. Which leads us to the question of the kinds of tactics that might have some chance of securing a future for young people of this generations and generations to come. One way we might think about this is in terms of right action. Right action stems from a Buddhist concept centered on intention. Specifically, right actions are those acts which originate in intentions associated with, non-attachment, benevolence and understanding, as opposed to action rooted in what Buddhist thought would characterize as negative intentions, of greed, hatred, and delusion.
The idea that, before we think of tactics, we should investigate our intentions, runs counter to western ethics founded on universal predetermined sets of rights or rules for living. To work from the intentions that form our actions is an intriguing way to think of how we form the structures and rules for our programs in CYC, as well as the ways in which we construct our modes of practice.
For example, what are the intentions that drive rules about swearing or disrespect of staff? It seems unlikely that they are premised in principles of non-attachment, benevolence, or understanding. I would suggest that if we were non-attached, something like swearing or what we might see as disrespect might be read very differently. Perhaps, being less attached to our own sense of propriety or self-valorization as adults might allow us to engage in a process of understanding why young people might be angry with us. It might open up possibilities of benevolence through which we might see young people’s struggles and the expressions of that struggle as worthy of deep consideration and compassion rather than judgement or censure. The Buddhist approach of right action would ask us to consider whether a rules based system of care is perhaps unconsciously or even unintentionally rooted in a kind of hatred of the young people we encounter in our work. I don’t mean an overt and directed hatred, but the kind of hatred that dismisses the legitimacy of struggle over the power relations to be found in the adult-child binary, where the adult is always seen as in charge.
Regrettably, this kind of subtle hatred can be found with some regularity in the relationships between young people and adults. As adults, we often hold a sense of resentment and even envy when we encounter young people’s inherent vitality and relatively larger degrees of freedom. It is not uncommon for us to want to assert the kind of order and control that would constrict the behaviors of young people in such a way that they would act more like adults. That is to say, to restrict their emotions, behaviors and aspirations so that they become increasingly conventional, acceptable, and appropriate. Rather than admit our own frustrations with the ever increasing demands and restrictions placed on us as aspiring adults, we turn our self -hatred for who we are becoming on the young people who represent a lost freedom we once had.
Of course, this is a very ambivalent positioning. For many of us just entering the field, we want to celebrate youth and young people. We love their creativity and struggle within a society that so often neglects and dismisses them as living people while exploiting them as fully as possible as memes and algorithms. But, as we enter the institutions that serve the young people we desire to engage, we find ourselves conscripted into regimes of domination and control in the name of healing and safety. Over time, we become institutionalized and reflexively enforce the rules that place us at odds with the very young people we intended to love and support. I am not saying that love and support are not possible within behaviorally managed programs, but it has to occur either in the service of establishing order, or in the margins and cracks when no one is looking.
To ground our actions as workers in conventional sets of rules and expectations is what Kant would call moral action. That is to say, action that is engaged through a sense of moral duty. These kinds of actions are derived from the moral dictates and conventions of the historical and cultural milieu in which we are embedded. Certainly, rule based systems of care reiterated a across institutions of care for young people are saturated with moral acts. We act on behalf of our employers, who in turn are acting out a set of conventional ideas of what is right and wrong in relation to youth-adult relations. While we might find ourselves in agreement with the rules and regulations we are implementing, we are obligated to carry them out whether we agree with them or not. To be a good worker, in an institutional context, is to be a compliant worker in terms of the needs and dictates of the institution in which we carry out our duties. If the program rules say that a certain set of behaviors is wrong, we are obligated to act in accordance with this set of moral precepts. This sense of obligation is key to Kant’s notion of moral acts and something he felt was actually quite useful to establishing and maintaining a functioning social order.
Obligation, however, has some troubling implications for those of us interested in working within the CYC ethos of relational care. When one operates out of obligation, there is a certain amount of damage done to the kind of relationships that CYC would seem to promote. In particular, CYC has traditionally had an investment in a certain kind of work centered on an authentic encounter between young people and CYC workers. This kind of encounter is founded in the work of humanistic psychologist such as Carl Rogers and the theoretical foundations of existentialism as articulated by Jean Paul Sartre, In the case of Rogers, he proposed that relational work required what he called congruence or authenticity in order to be healing or transformative. For him, anyone seeking to engage others for the purpose of assisting them to live their lives more fully, needed to bring themselves fully into the encounter. There is a necessity for a kind of transparency in which what the worker is presenting to the young person is an accurate reflection of who they really are. To go back to the Buddhist notion of right action their deepest intention should be written on the surface of their actions. This is quite difficult to do, if not impossible, if one is acting out of obligation to rules and regulations based on standards of right and wrong determined by an institution or society writ large. The philosopher Sartre goes even further and proposes that acting out of the version of ourselves that is produced out of the conventional rules of society, is to act in what he called bad faith. He suggests that to act in such a way is a betrayal of ourselves. That we diminish our living, creative capacities and become mere shadows of ourselves.
The problem with moral acts, as acts of obligation, is two-fold. In the first instance it reduces the integrity of the relational work we might be able to do with the young people we encounter in our work. In a perverse way, when we act out of obligation, the young person ceases to fully interact with us as a fellow human being and begins to interact with us as a functionary of the institution. We lose the real source of relational work which is the nature of the relationship itself. The kinds of relationship young people can have with another person who is living as fully as possible is very different from the kind of relationship they might have with an intermediary of the institution.
Let me clear, institutions cannot love anyone, care for anyone, listen to anyone, or protect anyone. Institutions are abstractions. They are made up of some kind of physical plant and flows of documents and money. The function of an institution is to continue itself as long as possible. Of course it has no ability to do that without a parasitic relationship with living persons who can think and act on its behalf.
When the relationship between the institution and the people who create and support it functions on behalf of the people, that institution will cease to exist at the moment it serves its own interests over its initial purpose as a vehicle for humans working collectively to better meet their needs. On the other hand, when institutional needs for continuance take precedence over human needs, the institution becomes a predatory parasite that sucks the living energy out of anyone within its confines. Whenever we find ourselves working on behalf of institutional imperatives rather than human needs, we are in dangerous territory. A clue as to whether or not we are in trouble is the degree to which we are operating out of obligation rather than acting in congruence with our own creativity and living force.
To act out of congruence with our own creativity and living force is to act out of what Kant called our own inclinations. These acts arise naturally and without effort. Kant called these beautiful acts, as opposed to moral acts. Beautiful acts flow within the ecological living imperatives of the moment, rather than by a sense of duty or obligation. Tactically, Naess proposes that they are far more useful in bringing about real and substantive change, because they arise easily and without effort. They are not acts of resistance, but acts of affirmation. In CYC, they would be the moments where we really connect with young people in a way that affirms both their lived experience, as well as our own. Under regimes of obligation and duty, beautiful acts are acts of revolt and revolution that move beyond the institution into the realm of a richer and deeper collectivity. I hope that, as we move from the depths of winter into spring in the northern hemisphere, we can learn to act beautifully in bringing about worlds in which we can all be free to act as fully as possible.